A Secure Access Control system in Cloud
Published on Sep 16, 2019
Personal health record (PHR) is an emerging patient-centric model of health information exchange, which is often outsourced to be stored at a third party, such as cloud providers. However, there have been wide privacy concerns as personal health information could be exposed to those third party servers and to unauthorized parties. To assure the patients’ control over access to their own PHRs, it is a promising method to encrypt the PHRs before outsourcing.
Yet, issues such as risks of privacy exposure, scalability in key management, flexible access and efficient user revocation, have remained the most important challenges toward achieving fine-grained, cryptographically enforced data access control. In this paper, we propose a novel patient-centric framework and a suite of mechanisms for data access control to PHRs stored in semi-trusted servers. To achieve fine-grained and scalable data access control for PHRs, we leverage attribute based encryption (ABE) techniques to encrypt each patient’s PHR file.
Different from previous works in secure data outsourcing, we focus on the multiple data owner scenario, and divide the users in the PHR system into multiple security domains that greatly reduces the key management complexity for owners and users. A high degree of patient privacy is guaranteed simultaneously by exploiting multi-authority ABE. Our scheme also enables dynamic modification of access policies or file attributes, supports efficient on-demand user/attribute revocation and break-glass access under emergency scenarios. Extensive analytical and experimental results are presented which show the security, scalability and efficiency of our proposed scheme.
A PHR service allows a patient to create, manage, and control her personal health data in one place through the web, which has made the storage, retrieval, and sharing of the the medical information more efficient. Especially, each patient is promised the full control of her medical records and can share her health data with a wide range of users, including healthcare providers, family members or friends. Due to the high cost of building and maintaining specialized data centers, many PHR services are outsourced to or provided by third-party service providers, for example, Microsoft HealthVault While it is exciting to have convenient PHR services for everyone, there are many security and privacy risks which could impede its wide adoption.
The main concern is about whether the patients could actually control the sharing of their sensitive personal health information (PHI), especially when they are stored on a third-party server which people may not fully trust. On the one hand, although there exist healthcare regulations such as HIPAA which is recently amended to incorporate business associates , cloud providers are usually not covered entities. On the other hand, due to the high value of the sensitive personal health information (PHI), the third-party storage servers are often the targets of various malicious behaviors which may lead to exposure of the PHI.
DISADVANTAGES OF EXISTING SYSTEM:
A Department of Veterans Affairs database containing sensitive PHI of 26.5 million military veterans, including their social security numbers and health problems was stolen by an employee who took the data home without authorization
A feasible and promising approach would be to encrypt the data before outsourcing. Basically, the PHR owner herself should decide how to encrypt her files and to allow which set of users to obtain access to each file. A PHR file should only be available to the users who are given the corresponding decryption key, while remain confidential to the rest of users. Furthermore, the patient shall always retain the right to not only grant, but also revoke access privileges when they feel it is necessary In this paper, we endeavor to study the patientcentric, secure sharing of PHRs stored on semi-trusted servers, and focus on addressing the complicated and challenging key management issues.
In order to protect the personal health data stored on a semi-trusted server, we adopt attribute-based encryption (ABE) as the main encryption primitive. Using ABE, access policies are expressed based on the attributes of users or data, which enables a patient to selectively share her PHR among a set of users by encrypting the file under a set of attributes, without the need to know a complete list of users. The complexities per encryption, key generation and decryption are only linear with the number of attributes involved.
ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED SYSTEM:
To ensure patient-centric privacy control over their own PHRs, it is essential to have fine-grained data access control mechanisms that work with semi-trusted servers.
2. Upload files
3. ABE for Fine-grained Data Access Control
4. Setup and Key Distribution
In this module normal registration for the multiple users. There are multiple owners, multiple AAs, and multiple users. The attribute hierarchy of files – leaf nodes is atomic file categories while internal nodes are compound categories. Dark boxes are the categories that a PSD’s data reader have access to. Two ABE systems are involved: for each PSD the revocable KP-ABE scheme is adopted for each PUD, our proposed revocable MA-ABE scheme.
PUD - public domains
PSD - personal domains
AA - attribute authority
MA-ABE - multi-authority ABE
KP-ABE - key policy ABE
In this module, users upload their files with secure key probabilities. The owners upload ABE-encrypted PHR files to the server. Each owner’s PHR file encrypted both under a certain fine grained model.
ABE for Fine-grained Data Access Control
In this module ABE to realize fine-grained access control for outsourced data especially, there has been an increasing interest in applying ABE to secure electronic healthcare records (EHRs). An attribute-based infrastructure for EHR systems, where each patient’s EHR files are encrypted using a broadcast variant of CP-ABE that allows direct revocation. However, the cipher text length grows linearly with the number of un revoked users. In a variant of ABE that allows delegation of access rights is proposed for encrypted EHRs applied cipher text policy ABE (CP-ABE) to manage the sharing of PHRs, and introduced the concept of social/professional domains investigated using ABE to generate self-protecting EMRs, which can either be stored on cloud servers or cell phones so that EMR could be accessed when the health provider is offline.
Setup and Key Distribution
In this module the system first defines a common universe of data attributes shared by every PSD, such as “basic profile”, “medical history”, “allergies”, and “prescriptions”. An emergency attribute is also defined for break-glass access. Each PHR owner’s client application generates its corresponding public/master keys. The public keys can be published via user’s profile in an online healthcare social-network (HSN)
There are two ways for distributing secret keys.
First, when first using the PHR service, a PHR owner can specify the access privilege of a data reader in her PSD, and let her application generate and distribute corresponding key to the latter, in a way resembling invitations in GoogleDoc.
Second, a reader in PSD could obtain the secret key by sending a request (indicating which types of files she wants to access) to the PHR owner via HSN, and the owner will grant her a subset of requested data types. Based on that, the policy engine of the application automatically derives an access structure, and runs keygen of KP-ABE to generate the user secret key that embeds her access structure.
System : Pentium IV 2.4 GHz.
Hard Disk : 40 GB.
Monitor : 15 VGA Colour.
Mouse : Logitech.
Ram : 512 Mb.
Mobile : Android Mobile
Oper at ing Sys tem: Android
Language : ANDROID SDK 2.3
Documentat ion : Ms-Office